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[T]he state of corporate governance to a very large extent reflects the character
of the CEO, and ... this is a very difficult issue to address. Although we
may not be able to change the character of corporate officers, we can change
behavior through incentives and penalties. That, in my judgment, could
dramatically improve the state of corporate governance.
- Alan Greenspan
1
In the post-Enron era, there has been considerable discussion
about what went wrong at Enron and elsewhere and how to fix it.
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2 the New York Stock Ex-
change adopted new corporate governance regulations introducing
new checks and balances,3 and other self-regulatory organizations fol-
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I Conduct of Monetary Policy: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th
Cong. 60 (2002) [hereinafter Monetary Policy] (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman,
Federal Reserve Board).
2 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.
and 18 U.S.C.).
3 See, e.g., NYSE Rule SR-NYSE-2002-46: Shareholder Approval of Equity Compensa-
tion Plans, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-gov-shareholder.pdf (Oct. 7, 2002) (propos-
ing an amendment to section 303A(8) of Exchange's Listed Company Manual to increase
shareholder control over equity-compensation plans); NYSE Rule SR-NYSE-2002-33: Cor-
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lowed suit.4 In addition, the Securities and Exchange Commission,
prior to and continuing after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, has
promulgated many governance- and disclosure-oriented regulations.5
One voice, however, has been fairly quiet. The State of Delaware, the
mother of all corporate law, has been largely absent from the debate.
The Delaware judiciary, however, has issued several opinions that indi-
cate movement may be afoot. 6 This Article raises several questions
about Delaware's (declining) role in corporate law, and discusses the
emerging duty of good faith and its potential for curbing abuses such
as those seen in the past few years.
INTRODUCTION
According to Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan, when greed
swept through our nation, we were not prepared to address it.
7
Boards of directors, corporate officers, lawyers, accountants, and
others failed to detect wrongdoing and blow the whistle. Although
the federal government has created new laws and duties for corporate
officers, directors, and gatekeepers, the Delaware legislature has, until
recently, been silent. Indeed, other than New York Attorney General
Elliot Spitzer's actions, most states have been largely absent from the
debate.
For many years, people have regarded Delaware as the place from
which corporate governance practices emanated. The Delaware stat-
utes provide mechanisms for key corporate governance decisions in
default form, leaving corporations to adopt their own practices and
procedures.8 The rationale behind this statutory scheme is that the
business of business is better left to those in charge of it rather than to
judges and legislators. Of course, the federal securities laws have filled
much of the void in state regulations and statutes, at least as to public
porate Governance Rule Filing, http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp-gov-pro-b.pdf (Aug. 16,
2002) (amendment section 303A requiring majority of independent directors on listed
company directory and revising definition of independent).
4 See, e.g., NATIONAL Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, INC., PROPOSED RULE CHANGE, FILE No.
SR-NASD-2003-140, http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/rf03_140.pdf (Sept. 15, 2003)
(prohibiting members from allocating shares to officers, directors, and family members).
5 See, e.g., Disclosure of Equity Compensation Plan Information, 17 C.F.R. Release
No. 33-8048 (Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, and 249), at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8048.htm (adopting new provisions for Forms 10-K
and 10-KSB requiring disclosure to shareholders of options, warrants, and rights registrants
grant in form of equity compensation); 17 C.F.R. Release No. 33-8124 (Aug. 28, 2002) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, and 249), at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8124.htm (promulgating regulations pursuant to § 302(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley Act requiring
issuer's principal financial and executive officers to certify financial and certain other in-
formation in quarterly and annual reports).
6 See infra Part II.D-E.
7 See Monetay Policy, supra note 1, at 5.
8 See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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companies. 9 But gaps remain, and Delaware's legislature is partly to
blame. It created several of the existing gaps and has been largely
absent from the recent debate about the reform of corporate law and
corporate governance. As a result, some think that "Delaware has a
bad name, as a haven for incumbent management." 10
Delaware is not alone in its silence. Although calls for corporate
and accounting reform have filled the newspapers, similar pleas for
reforming state corporate law have been minimal at best.11 Commen-
tators have looked to Congress and the SROs, but none have de-
manded that the states assert themselves, or, more specifically, that
Delaware assert itself and begin to take an active role in regulating
state corporate governance issues.
Of course, the Delaware legislature has not regulated the recent
types of corporate-governance failures in years. In the landmark Dela-
ware case of Smith v. Van Gorkom,12 the court found directors person-
ally liable for breaches of the duty of care. In response, a healthy
debate ensued over the judiciary's ability to measure care properly.
13
At the same time, the insurance rates of directors and officers rose,
resulting in concerns about the "continued availability of talented,
outside directors. ' 14 In short, some believed that courts are ill-
equipped to measure fiduciary due care, particularly in hindsight.
Others retorted that the facts of Van Gorkom were particularly severe
and that the judiciary would restrict itself to finding liability only in
the worst cases. The legislature responded by abdicating part of its
role in regulating corporate governance and adopting the now ubiqui-
tous exculpatory statute that allows companies, at the directors' initia-
tive, to exempt themselves from damages for failing to adhere to their
duty of care.1 5 As a result, the legislature stifled a potential common
law evolution of the duty of care and any accompanying discussion
9 See Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REv. 859, 860-61 (2003). For a critique of the ex-
panding federal role in corporate governance, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping
Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, Spring 2003, at 26.
10 Barbarians in the Valley, THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 61, 62 [hereinafter
Barbarians].
11 At the time this Article went to press, only California had adopted a reform to its
state laws that was arguably an attempt to respond to the corporate governance crisis. See
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1502.5 (West 2002) (new filing requirement for California corporations
that includes new compensation disclosures accompanied by fee for Victims of Corporate
Fraud Compensation Fund). Pennsylvania was considering an amendment to criminalize
knowingly false statements to auditors. See 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 4107 (2003).
12 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
13 For an overview of the scholarship on this opinion, see Van Gorkom and the Corpo-
rate Board: Problem, Solution, or Placebo?, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 447, 447-48 (2002).
14 Frederick D. Lipman, Directors' Liabilities: Legislature Lends a Helping Hand, Focus,
May 1987, at 78, 79.
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (2001) (amended 2003).
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about its norms and components, or even its proper place in the ru-
bric of corporate governance.
Even if plaintiffs could avoid the exculpation barrier, the Dela-
ware legislature had limited personal jurisdiction in Delaware courts
to board members. Thus, the courts did not have jurisdiction over
most corporate officer fiduciaries. Yet, in today's world, directors play
less of a role in establishing corporate norms than their officer coun-
terparts.16 The result was a strong intimation of permissiveness for
the officer fiduciaries who make the day-to-day decisions and set the
tone of internal governance.
A similar stumbling block grew out of a series ofjudicial opinions
rendering pre-suit demand on a board determinative of that board's
interest and independence.1 7 This obstacle, applicable at the motion
to dismiss stage, acted as a barrier to litigation over fiduciary duty
breaches for some time. The result was a stunting of the growth in the
proper corporate governance norms for handling pre-suit demands,
and presumably, the substantive law of fiduciary duties blocked by the
demand rubric. The Delaware Supreme Court modified the doctrine
in 1997-noting that demand does not concede board independence
"conclusively"-18-thus allowing the case law to evolve again.
During the last few years, however, an important common-law
change has emerged indicating that at least the Delaware judiciary is
at work in this area. ChiefJustice Veasey recently made clear that un-
less Delaware wants to cede corporate law and regulation to the fed-
eral government, it must act.' 9 And the perception is that the state's
judges "have become more sensitive to the wishes of big shareholders,
and . . .will be listening attentively." 20 One way in which the courts
16 At the time of this Article, Delaware had recently passed new legislation to make
certain corporate officers, elected afterJanuary 1, 2004, subject to personal jurisdiction in
Delaware. See S.B. 126, 142d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003) (enacted) (amending
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 3114).
17 See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del. 1991) (holding that shareholder-
plaintiff who makes demand on board concedes disinterest and independence), rev'd on
other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d
767, 773 (1990) (same).
18 See Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 74-75 (Del. 1997), rev'd
on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
19 See E. Norman Veasey, State-Federal Tension in Corporate Governance and the Professional
Responsibilities of Advisors, 28 J. CORP. L. 441, 443 (2003) ("[T]here are emerging federal
statutory duties and SEC Rules ... that may trump Delaware fiduciary law.... ."); see also
Biondi v. Scrushy, 820 A.2d 1148 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding special litigation committee
could not meet burden of proving its independence); In re Oracle Derivative Litig., 824
A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (finding special litigation committee lacked requisite indepen-
dence); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U.
PA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003); Leo E. Strine,Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on
the Corporation Law Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAw. 1371 (2002).
20 Barbarians, supra note 10, at 62.
2004]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
are acting is through their reference to and expansion of the third
element in the fiduciary trilogy of care, loyalty, and good faith. Good
faith is increasingly a topic of discussion in cases, in practice, and in
academic circles, and the evolution of good faith as a duty may well
become the test of the commitment and good faith of Delaware's cor-
porate law and lawmakers.
This Article examines the doctrine of good faith and its more
recent evolution. Part I lays the groundwork for that discussion, re-
viewing basic corporate governance concepts and the ways in which
Delaware has chosen to regulate them. Part II provides a discussion
and analysis of several key cases that add to our knowledge of the duty
and how it might function. Finally, Part III develops the duty further
from those cases and through analogies to the case law used to limit
the scienter element of federal securities fraud claims, arguing that
federal law has much to offer Delaware in the development of a doc-
trine of good faith. The Article concludes with suggestions for the
role of good faith and its application to corporate fiduciaries.
I
GENERAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONCEPTS IN DELAWARE
The term "corporate governance" is widely used to refer to the
balance of power between officers, directors, and shareholders. Aca-
demics often discuss it in the context of regulating communications
and combating agency costs where corporate officers and directors
have the power to control the company, but the owners are diverse
and largely inactive shareholders. 21 Good corporate governance,
then, allows for a balance between what officers and directors do and
what shareholders desire. The term implies that managers have the
proper incentives to work on behalf of shareholders and that share-
holders are properly informed about the activities of managers.
Of course, in today's world of diversified shareholding, most
shareholders no longer hold for corporate control and cannot moni-
tor the corporation's daily activities. 22 In the past, legal theory as-
sumed that market monitors, or gatekeepers, partially fulfilled that
21 See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Christine Jolls, Managerial Value Diversion and
Shareholder Wealth, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 487 (1999) (finding reduction in shareholder
wealth by studying, in principal-agent model, effects of diverting value to shareholders'
delegated agents); see also ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPO-
RATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (Adolf A. Berle ed., 1968) (discussing divorce of owner-
ship and control over corporate wealth); see generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, § 1.5
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2002) (discussing agents, costs, and theory of firm).
22 See MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL
CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT 38 (2003) (locating the diffusion of American shareholders
in a political context).
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monitoring role. 23 Recent events, however, make clear that they have
not been fulfilling their assumed duties for quite some time.
24
Recent events also reveal that the other monitors, corporate fidu-
ciaries, have been neglecting their duties to the corporation, and
through it, to owner shareholders. Under Delaware statutes, directors
are the prescribed overseers-the statutes refer to them as the ulti-
mate corporate controllers 25 -and accordingly, the corporate govern-
ance provisions are director-focused. The statutes refer to directors as
the ultimate corporate controllers. Much of the recent academic cor-
porate governance debate has focused on whether directors, if given
the proper incentives and if sufficiently independent, will properly
manage officers.2 6 Current events indicate that the answer, at least for
this era, is no.27 Directors have not been sufficiently active or inde-
pendent. Officers have failed to adhere to their duties. Indeed, some
of the recent corporate scandals can be tied to governance failures
23 See generallyJill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IowA L. REv. 1035 (2003) (critically evaluating various roles of
analysts as information gatekeepers and catalysts for market efficiency); RonaldJ. Gibson &
Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1983) (argu-
ing that different mechanisms help achieve market efficiency with respect to different
pieces of information, depending on participants' transaction costs in obtaining that infor-
mation); Jonathan Macey & Hillary A. Sale, Commodification, Independence, Governance, and
the Demise of Accounting Profession, 48 VILL. L. REv. 101 (forthcoming 2003) (analyzing de-
cline in accounting professionalism and conflicts diminishing their prescribed roles as
market gatekeepers).
24 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57
Bus. LAw. 1403, 1406-07 (2002) (pointing out "a general erosion in the quality of financial
reporting during the late 1990s").
25 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (a) (2001) (amended 2003) (stating that
"[t]he business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be man-
aged by or under the direction of a board of directors"); see generally Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 547
(2003).
26 See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 25; Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate
Boards of Directors, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 781 (2003); Robert B. Thompson, Collaborative
Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law, and Federal Regulation, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 961 (2003).
27 Apparently, the same was true in 1933. The Senate Report of what was to become
the Securities Act of 1933 reveals that the Act did not relieve directors of liability for disclo-
sure violations unless they had fulfilled their duties. For example, in the purpose section
of the legislation, the Senate stated:
This phase of the law will have a direct tendency to preclude persons from
acting as nominal directors while shirking their duty to know and guide the
affairs of the corporation. Upon the discharge of this duty the public and
stockholders rely in good faith. We cannot but believe that many recent
disastrous events in the investment world would not have taken place if
those whose names have appeared as directors had known themselves to be
under a legal, as well as a moral, responsibility to the investing public.
S. REP. No. 73-47, at 5 (1933), reprinted inJ.S. ELLENBERGER & ELLEN P. MAHAR, 2 LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACr OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, item
no. 17 (1973).
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and the inability-or unwillingness-of officer and director fiducia-
ries to manage faithfully. 28
Delaware has, for the most part, chosen to let corporations de-
cide what constraints, if any, they should impose on their fiduciaries. 29
Although Delaware officers and directors previously had an enforcea-
ble duty of care, 30 the state legislature eliminated this duty-despite
protestations to the contrary by the Delaware judiciary-when it
adopted the exculpation statute, section 102(b) (7).31 This provision
allows companies to eliminate damages for breaches of the duty of
care, 32 leaving injunctive relief as the only available remedy.
33 It
should not be surprising, then, to learn that care-based cases are in
the minority of derivative and class action cases filed in Delaware.
34
Much ink has been spilled over Van Gorkom, the case that resulted
in Delaware's exculpation legislation. In light of today's corporate
scandals, it is worth reexamining that case along with a few others.
This discrete group of cases reveals the underpinnings of the emerg-
ing doctrine of a separate duty: the fiduciary duty of good faith. That
duty holds considerable promise for creating incentives to instill effec-
tive corporate governance and preventing the kind of fiduciary abdi-
cation that has occurred.
28 Although the statutes refer to directors, the fiduciary duties discussed in this Article
apply both to directors and officers. The cases refer largely to directors because of the
oddity of the personal jurisdiction statute allowing for suit against directors, but not of-
ficers. Because the duties apply to both, for the purposes of this Article, the term fiduciary
or fiduciaries refers to both officers and directors.
29 Much of the Delaware code is default rather than mandatory in nature. See generally
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-103(d) (2002) (noting policy "to give maximum effect to the
principle of freedom of contract").
30 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) ("In carrying out
their managerial roles, directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to the cor-
poration and its shareholders.").
31 Section 102(b) (7) creates a place for exculpation provisions in certificates of incor-
poration by stating that the certifications can contain:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to the
corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduci-
ary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or
limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's duty of
loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not
in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing viola-
tion of law: (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any transaction from
which the director derived an improper personal benefit.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001) (amended 2003).
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., Turner v. Bernstein, 776 A.2d 530, 549 (Del. Ch. 2000) (stating that al-
though exculpation provisions bar damages for duty of care breaches, they do not prohibit
claims for injunctive relief).
34 See Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The New Look of Shareholder Litiga-
tion: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 56 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003) (approximately
twenty percent of derivative claims filed in Delaware in 1999 and 2000 make allegations




NON-LOYALTY FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN DELAWARE: KEY CASES
The Delaware Supreme Court has referred to the duties of a fidu-
ciary as composed of three elements: care, loyalty, and good faith.
3 5
The good faith element has not been explored in much detail, either
by the courts or academics. A series of cases from Delaware, however,
reveal an emerging doctrine of good faith.
Presumably, good faith may be applied either as an obligation to
the other two key duties, care and loyalty, or as a freestanding duty.
The former would make it similar to the good faith obligation that
exists in contract law where good faith applies as an obligation to per-
form contract duties. 3 6 Good faith in this forum would allow one to
claim a bad faith breach of care or loyalty. 37 Some members of the
Delaware Chancery Court have defined good faith as a subset of or an
obligation tied to the duty of loyalty, thus limiting it to a role in the
context of loyalty. Consider, for example, the words of then-Vice-
Chancellor Jacobs:
Although corporate directors are unquestionably obligated to act in
good faith, doctrinally that obligation does not exist separate and
apart from the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Rather, it is a subset or
"subsidiary requirement" that is subsumed within the duty of loyalty,
35 See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) ("The directors of
Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good
faith." (footnotes omitted)); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000) ("The ...
Board owed fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good faith to all . . . shareholders .... ).
36 See, e.g., Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917) (finding im-
plied promise to make all reasonable efforts to fully perform a contract); see generally
STEVEN J. BURTON & Eic G. ANDERSEN, CONTRACTUAL GOOD FAITH: FORMATION, PERFORM-
ANCE, BREACH, ENFORCEMENT (1995); Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking
Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 955, 979 (1995)
(discussing standards for good faith in different contexts); Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It
Appropriate to Appropriate Corporate Concepts: Fiduciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partner-
ship Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 114 (1993) (noting that "the courts have extracted broad-
based fiduciary duties" from Act); Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity
Contracts: Reining in Good Faith, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 319 (2002) (reviewingjudicial deploy-
ment of good-faith doctrine in requirements contracts).
37 See, e.g., McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818-19 (6th Cir. 2001) (applying Delaware
law to hold that some reckless acts may be acts not in good faith and, therefore, not prop-
erly exculpated from liability under section 102(b)(7)) (citing BALOTri & FINKELSTEIN, 1
DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 4.29 at 4-115--4-116.1 (3d
ed. Supp. 2000), stating that:
Whether the statute would protect a director against reckless acts is not
altogether clear. To the extent that recklessness involves a conscious disre-
gard of a known risk, it could be argued that such an approach is not one
taken in good faith and thus could not be liability exempted under the new
statute. On the other hand, to the extent that the conduct alleged to be
reckless is predicated solely on allegations of sustained inattention to the
duty it is arguable whether such conduct is "grossly negligent," but not con-
duct amounting to bad faith.
2004] 463
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as distinguished from being a compartmentally distinct fiduciary
duty of equal dignity with the two bedrock fiduciary duties of loyalty
and due care.
3 8
Alternatively, a freestanding duty of good faith is potentially more
expansive, requiring fiduciary compliance in its own right and encour-
aging fiduciary parties to comply with their obligations, thereby avoid-
ing the related shame for noncompliance. 39 In contrast to the
approach described above, the Delaware Supreme Court now lists the
duty as separate and on par with the other two. 40 Older cases arguably
did the same. 41 This distinction is important. As a separate duty,
good faith can attach to situations beyond those invoking loyalty con-
cerns and can grow to address its own category of governance issues.
In my examination of the cases in this section, I argue that the
courts have laid the groundwork for such a freestanding duty. Of
course, like all common law, the precise contours of the duty will be
clarified as courts apply the concept to difficult factual patterns.
Nonetheless, existing cases do shed light on the potential limits of
good faith. Moreover, reexamining the duty of good faith in the fac-
tual context of these cases indicates that as an independent duty, good
faith offers powerful incentives for making better corporate govern-
ance decisions.
A. Smith v. Van Gorkom
42
The first key governance case, Van Gorkom was a shareholder class
action suit decided mostly in the disclosure context, but also held that
the company's directors had neglected their duty of care when they
failed to explore fully a strategic combination presented by the
CEO.4 3 The duty of due care is an important starting point for a dis-
cussion about recent events, because it is closely tied to accountabil-
38 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 2001 WL 115340, *25 n.63 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2001),
vacated by 787 A.2d 85 (2001), remanded to No. CIV.A. 9700, 2003 WL 21003437 (Del. Ch.
Apr. 28, 2003) (citing In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475
n.41 (Del. Ch. 2000) (taking issue with Delaware Supreme Court's practice of listing good
faith as separate duty)).
39 See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REv. 1009, 1017, 1103-04 (1997).
40 See, e.g., Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d 85; Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 361 (Del. 1993) ("To rebut the rule, a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of
providing evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision, breached any one
of the triads of their fiduciary duty-good faith, loyalty or due care.").
41 See, e.g., Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del.
1989) (noting that to rebut business judgment rule, plaintiff must introduce evidence of
self-dealing or self-interest, such as loyalty concerns, good faith, or failure to exercise due
care).
42 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), superseded by statute as stated in Emerald Partners, 787 A.2d
85.
43 Id. at 881.
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ity.4 4 Directors and officers who comply with the duty of due care are
less likely to violate other duties. They are more likely to weigh deci-
sions, consult with appropriate advisers, and disclose conflicts of inter-
est. Thus, they are more likely to act both loyally and in good faith
and run their companies in an ethical manner. Essentially, the pre-
mise is that good procedure leads to good substance.
The Delaware Supreme Court held the duty of due care to re-
quire that fiduciaries make informed decisions with the requisite
amount of attention to detail and process.45 In so holding, the court
made clear that the duty is procedural, not substantive. 46 Courts mon-
itor the duty through the business judgment rule, which delegates the
business and affairs of Delaware corporations to the board of direc-
tors. 47 The business judgment rule presumes that in making decisions
and managing the corporation, fiduciaries have "acted on an in-
formed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company."48 Plaintiffs can rebut
the business judgment rule by showing that the board's decision was
uninformed.
49
To fulfill their duty prior to making a business decision, fiducia-
ries must inform themselves of all material information reasonably
available; 50 uninformed and unadvised judgments are not protected.
51
Instead, as a fiduciary, an officer or a director acts on behalf of the
shareholders, and in that capacity must fully assess information before
making decisions. 52 A grossly negligent failure to do so, even absent
bad faith or fraud, violates the duty of due care. 53
In Van Gorkom, the Delaware court applied this "informed-and-
deliberate" standard to a merger transaction, holding, in part, that
directors cannot create a safe harbor for their decisions simply by se-
curing shareholder approval.54 Rendering a decision without the im-
44 Cf Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An
Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REv. 477, 529 (1995) (arguing that
securities laws concerning mandatory disclosure facilitate accountability).
45 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872-73.
46 See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) [hereinafter Brehm I] (noting
that "substantive" due care violations are misplaced in corporate decisionmaking context).
47 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
48 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,812 (Del. 1984); STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORA-
TION LAW AND ECONOMICS, § 6.4, at 269 (2002) (noting that "assumption" is better term
than "presumption," which is used in evidence contexts and differently).




53 Id. at 872-73.
54 Id. at 889-93.
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plementation of a thorough process for examining the decision with
the requisite care is a violation of the duty of care.
55
Translated into practical terms, the duty of due care requires di-
rectors and officers to slow their decisionmaking process by weighing
appropriate alternatives, seeking appropriate advice from lawyers, ac-
countants, or bankers, and considering the long-term implications of
their decisions. 56 According to the Delaware Supreme Court, such de-
liberate behavior is, and should be, the norm. In Van Gorkom, the
court explained how the norm should be enforced: through the impo-
sition of substantial personal liability on the fiduciaries involved in the
challenged decision.57 This liability created an incentive for other fi-
duciaries to avoid such penalties and to adhere to the norms of good
corporate governance.
In a swift response to Van Gorkom, the Delaware legislature
amended the Delaware General Corporation Law to allow for an op-
tional charter provision to exculpate directors for violations of the
duty of due care. 58 Only the board of directors can propose the addi-
tion or removal of such a change to a corporation's charter.59 Share-
holders vote on the directors' recommendation, but once the
provision is adopted, shareholders cannot put it back on the ballot, to,
for example, remove it; only the directors can do so.60 The exculpa-
tory provision eliminates liability for due care violations and operates
55 Id. at 893. The court reiterated this standard in the context of good faith in Brehm
, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
56 See Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 889-93.
57 See, e.g., CHARLES R.T. O'KELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 258 n.1 (4th ed. 2003) (noting that director's liability
might have been as large as $133,577,580; that fact presumably resulted in settlement of
case for $23,000,000).
58 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (2002). In the wake of Van Gorkom, insurance
companies raised corporate insurance rates. Corporate lawyers and managers also com-
plained loudly and the specter of a crisis in quality board directors emerged. Approxi-
mately forty other states followed suit in enacting similar legislation. O'KELLEY &
THOMPSON, supra note 57, at 261. There is considerable academic scholarship about this
case, much of which is quite critical. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule
and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW 1437, 1455 (1985) (referring to case as "one of the
worst decisions in the history of corporate law"); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van
Gorkom: The Business ofJudging BusinessJudgment, 41 Bus. LAw 1187, 1188, 1190-91 (1986)
(critiquing opinion as "misguided" and likely to increase "randomness" of future deci-
sions). But see Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom After
Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw 1, 1, 6-7 (1985) (referring to opinion as bomb exploded in
wake of "race to bottom," yet noting that court was unlikely to be stringent in its applica-
tion). For a discussion recasting the case in the takeover context and arguing that from
this perspective the opinion is neither surprising nor threatening, see Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1988).




like an affirmative defense, applicable at the motion to dismiss stage. 61
As a result, it has tremendous potential power.
In a separate line of cases, however, the Delaware Supreme Court
carefully indicated that due care is unique in the world of exculpation
and has cabined the reach of such clauses in litigation over motions to
dismiss. Now, exculpation applies as an affirmative defense only as to
due care allegations that are not intertwined with other fiduciary alle-
gations, such as those involving loyalty or good faith. 62 If a complaint
alleges breaches of care intertwined, for example, with loyalty, and
rebuts the business judgment rule, the entire complaint will survive
the motion to dismiss. As a result of the exculpation clause, damages
are no longer available against directors for breaches of their duty of
due care.
B. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation
63
The Caremark case is a settlement opinion from the Court of
Chancery.64 Although it lacks the controlling power of an opinion of
the Supreme Court, Caremark generated considerable discussion as a
duty of due care case when issued. It remains an important contribu-
tion to the perceived standards of care, but arguably is also one of the
cases discussing good faith explicitly in the context of corporate
decisionmaking.
The issue in Caremark was whether the board had failed to moni-
tor sufficiently the company's compliance with the law. 65 Chancellor
Allen reviewed the adequacy of the settlement proposal, and noted
that to succeed with their case, the plaintiffs had to show that the di-
rectors knew or should have known that violations of the law were
occurring, yet "took no steps in a good faith effort to prevent or rem-
edy that situation," thereby resulting in a loss to the company.
66
On the basis of the record before it, the court first addressed
whether Caremark's directors had knowledge of violations of the law-
involving payments to physicians who had prescribed treatments that
Caremark had participated in providing-and found that the evi-
dence did not reveal that any of the directors knew of such viola-
61 See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91-92 (Del. 2001).
62 See id. at 92; see also Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1093 (Del. 2001) (af-
firming plaintiffs' concession that dismissal is appropriate where complaint "unambigu-
ously and solely" alleges due care claim); McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 926 (Del. 2000)
(noting that exculpation provision is not appropriately invoked for dismissal of claims of
due care intertwined with those of loyalty); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215,
1224 (Del. 1999) (holding that exculpation clause is properly invoked for dismissal where
"factual basis for a claim solely implicates" due care violation).
63 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
64 Id. at 959.
65 Id. at 960.
66 Id. at 971.
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tions.6 7 Instead, according to the court, the board appeared to have
relied on expert opinions stating that the company's practices, al-
though contestable, were lawful. 68 Absent evidence that the board's
reliance on those opinions was unreasonable, the court found that the
record did not support an argument that the directors had breached
their fiduciary duties by "knowingly causing the corporation to violate
a criminal statute."69 Further, the court noted that a standard requir-
ing directors "to possess detailed information about all aspects of the
operation of the enterprise .... would simpl[y] be inconsistent with
the scale and scope of efficient organizational size in this technologi-
cal age."
70
Next, the court examined whether the directors, though unaware
of the criminal violations, had failed to exercise sufficient oversight to
alert them to the likelihood of such violations. 7 1 Here, Chancellor
Allen explored the fiduciaries' duty of good faith, finding that "only a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight...
will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to
liability."72 The test, he noted, is "quite high," 73 consistent with the
general balance that Delaware courts have struck between encourag-
ing peer and company monitoring, and not discouraging qualified in-
dividuals from serving as board members.
Chancellor Allen did not find any evidence in the record of a
"sustained failure [by Caremark's directors] to exercise their oversight
function [,]" noting that the company's monitoring program appeared
to represent "a good faith attempt to be informed of relevant facts."
7 4
As a result, he concluded that the claims against the company were
"extremely weak. '75 This conclusion allowed Chancellor Allen to ac-
cept the settlement's proposed changes in corporate practice, even
though he stated that they did "not impress [him] as very
significant.
'7 6
The Delaware Supreme Court has never examined this opinion.
7 7
The explication of the good faith obligations-indeed, even the use of
that term-is dicta. Nevertheless, many commentators credit
67 Id. The federal sentencing guidelines, or federal pressure on Delaware law, played








75 Id. at 972.
76 Id. at 970.
77 The court has, however, cited the opinion with approval. See White v. Panic, 783
A.2d 543, 551-2 (Del. 2001).
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Caremark with updating the duties of directors from the 1963 Graham
v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing case, which held that absent red flags,
directors need not "ferret out wrongdoing. T7 In fact, one Delaware
Supreme Court Justice has indicated that he believes that Caremark
better represents today's standards of directorial conduct.
79
Caremark instructs fiduciaries to prevent and address problems
through compliance and monitoring programs. A sustained and utter
failure to ensure the existence of a functioning program may well be
grounds for a good-faith cause of action. Indeed, a failure to attempt
to comply with one's fiduciary duties is likely to result in a breach of
good faith. Thus, Caremark supports the position that good faith is not
simply another version of care, but rather is an emerging and inde-
pendent doctrine. Viewed in that context, Caremark lays the ground-
work for the argument that good faith is best understood as a
freestanding duty-one that creates its own incentives for fiduciaries
to make thoughtful decisions ex ante and that regulates, in part, abdi-
cation of the fiduciary's role.
C. Scattered Corp. v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc.80
In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court focused on the way in
which courts should review the refusal by officers and directors of a
corporation of a demand to investigate and remedy alleged corrup-
tion, addressing the existing standard of review that insulated direc-
tors from further litigation when plaintiffs chose to make a demand
before suing.8 l In Scattered, the plaintiffs, members of the Chicago
Stock Exchange, alleged that the defendants, officers and board mem-
bers of the Exchange, were involved in "systemic corruption of the
Exchange and its subsidiaries."8 2 According to the court, the alleged
corruption included "bribery, refusal to enforce violations of rules of
the Exchange by favored members, the hiring of 'ghost employees,'
and inappropriate discipline of nonfavored employees. '8 3 The plain-
tiffs submitted a draft complaint to the board along with a demand
that the board investigate the allegations and remedy all abuses.
8 4
In response, the chair of the board told the plaintiffs that the
Executive Committee had the "full authority to act for the Board be-
tween meetings,"8 5 and that the Executive Committee had appointed
78 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
79 See Veasey, supra note 19.
80 701 A.2d 70 (Del. 1997), overruled ly Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
81 See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.






a Special Committee to investigate the complaint. 86 The chair then
informed the plaintiffs that the Special Committee had reviewed the
allegations, retained independent counsel, interviewed more than
twenty-five individuals, and was unable to substantiate the demand.8 7
The chair also informed the plaintiffs that, "after careful considera-
tion, the Executive Committee had determined that there was no basis
upon which to take further action with respect to [their] demand."'8
The plaintiffs then filed a derivative suit in the Court of Chan-
cery, repeating the allegations contained in their demand. 9 Having
made a demand before filing suit, the plaintiffs faced judicial review
in the demand-refusal context.90 In its review, the Delaware Supreme
Court made two surprising moves. First, it refrained the standard ap-
plicable to demand-refusal cases, making clear that although prior
cases had indicated that the act of making demand conceded the dis-
interestedness and independence of the board, it did so only ex ante,
not ex post.91 The court thus ruled that a board that fails to act in a
disinterested or independent fashion while investigating a demand
fails to carry out its fiduciary duties.92 As a result, the court opened
for further litigation a door many had presumed closed by demand,
eliminating a key common law insulator for fiduciaries.
Second, the supreme court framed the test for review in terms of
good faith, not simply care. 93 The court stated that when "an other-
wise independent-appearing board or committee [fails] to act inde-
pendently [it fails] to carry out its fiduciary duties in good faith or to
conduct a reasonable investigation. Such failure could constitute
wrongful refusal. '94 In the end, the supreme court affirmed the Court
of Chancery's dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs had failed to plead
facts showing that either the Special Committee, as the investigator, or
the Executive Committee, as the decisionmaker, had failed to adhere
to its duties.95
One of the most interesting aspects of the opinion for the pur-
poses of examining what good faith might involve is the list of items
that the supreme court considered when it reviewed the findings of
86 Id. In fact, it later surfaced that the board, not the Executive Committee, ap-
pointed the Special Committee, but the Court of Chancery deemed this fact to be irrele-
vant. See id. at 72 & n.1.
87 Id. at 71.
88 Id. at 71-72.
89 Id. at 72.
90 Id. at 71-74.
91 Id. at 74.
92 Id. at 75.
93 See id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 76-77.
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the Court of Chancery.9 6 The court examined the following: the
board had created a Special Committee; the committee had inter-
viewed twenty-five people and others that the plaintiffs had indicated
could substantiate their claims of wrongful conduct; the committee
found that the allegations contained in the complaint were unsubstan-
tiated; and, finally, the Executive Committee, after carefully consider-
ing the committee's report, found no basis on which to take action.9 7
According to the supreme court, the Court of Chancery correctly con-
cluded on these facts that the Executive Committee's decision was
"the product of a valid exercise of business judgment."9 8 In the ab-
sence of any pleadings to show that these findings were not accurate,
the supreme court upheld the lower court's decision.99
Notably, although the Court of Chancery listed the factors in the
context of a duty of care, the supreme court listed them in the context
of the duty of good faith. Here again, the supreme court deployed
the term "good faith" as its term of choice for referring to the duty at
issue, making clear that something more than exculpable due care
was involved, furthering the growth of good faith and fiduciary re-
sponsibilities and even the emergence of good faith as a separate duty.
Scattered thus indicates that good faith applies to decisionmaking
processes, not just loyalty issues.
D. Brehm v. Eisner00
In two recent opinions, the Delaware courts further explicated
good faith, demonstrating that fiduciaries cannot avoid this duty. 01
Both opinions involved a lawsuit against fiduciaries at the Walt Disney
Company. In Brehm I, the Delaware Supreme Court explored and ex-
panded its good faith jurisprudence. 10 2 In Brehm II, the Court of
Chancery applied that jurisprudence to a complaint pleaded with in-
formation obtained pursuant to a demand for books and records and
found that the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient allegations of a fiduci-
ary breach to survive a motion to dismiss.10 3 These opinions build on
the earlier foundation of cases discussing good faith, provide further
elaboration on the nature of good faith, and move it toward a separate
duty. Of course, none of the cases develop bright-line rules for this-
96 See id. at 76.
97 Id.
98 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
99 See id. at 77.
100 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
101 See id. at 261 n.51 (noting that a presumption of good faith does not protect direc-
tors "without limitation"); see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 278
(Del. Ch. 2003) [hereinafter Brehm I1] (recognizing that plaintiffs' new complaint alleging
a lack of good faith "stated cognizable claims").
102 See Brehm I, 746 A.2d at 253-54.
103 Brehm II, 825 A.2d at 278.
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or any other-fiduciary duty.' 0 4 In part, that is because each situation
carries with it different facts, making a bright-line approach to the
three key elements of a fiduciary's duties impossible. The Disney
cases do, however, illustrate that allegations of abdications of govern-
ance responsibilities will lead to further expansion and regulation of
the duty of good faith.
Brehm I addressed a complaint (the "First Complaint"), in which
the shareholders sued derivatively, arguing that the directors had
breached their fiduciary duties in approving two contracts for Michael
Ovitz.1 0 5 According to Brehm I, the First Complaint included three
main arguments. 10 6 First, the plaintiffs alleged that the board violated
its duties in its initial approval of Ovitz's extravagant and wasteful em-
ployment contract (the "Employment Agreement"). 10 7 Second, they
argued that a year later, when the board approved the contract regu-
lating Ovitz's termination (the "Termination Agreement"), it
breached its duties by approving a non-fault agreement that was ex-
travagant and wasteful.108 And, third, the plaintiffs alleged that the
directors were not disinterested and independent. 109
The Court of Chancery dismissed the case with prejudice. 110 On
appeal, the supreme court reversed part of the "with prejudice" aspect
of the Court of Chancery opinion, allowing the plaintiffs to replead
some of their allegations."1 In reaching that outcome, the supreme
court made some strong statements about fiduciary duties and the
contract at issue. The court began by stating that "[t] his is potentially
a very troubling case on the merits." 112 According to the supreme
court, Ovitz's compensation and the Termination Agreement ap-
peared to be "exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious, compared to
[his] value to the Company .... 1113 The supreme court also noted
that, as alleged, the "processes of the boards of directors in dealing
with the approval and termination of the Ovitz Employment Agree-
ment were casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory." 114
104 In contrast, trust law provides bright line rules in some fiduciary contexts. See gener-
ally Robert Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming
March 2004) (contrasting sub rules of trust fiduciaries with more open-ended corporate
fiduciary standards).
105 Brehm 1, 746 A.2d at 248.
106 Id. at 248-49.
107 Id. at 248.
108 Id. at 248-49.
109 Id. at 249. The Court of Chancery had found that the plaintiffs failed to plead that
the directors were not disinterested and independent. The Delaware Supreme Court
agreed. Id. at 248 n.3.
110 Id. at 267.
III Id.





The plaintiffs caught the supreme court's attention with their al-
legation that the termination provisions of the Employment Agree-
ment and, ultimately, the Termination Agreement itself, were so
much more generous than his five-year contract that Ovitz had an in-
centive to orchestrate a non-fault termination as soon as possible after
the execution of the Employment Agreement. 115 Moreover, the plain-
tiffs argued that the board, although advised by a compensation ex-
pert, failed to consider the incentives that the Termination
Agreement created.116
The lower court had found that although the plaintiffs had
pleaded that the compensation expert who advised the board had ad-
mitted that "[n] obody quantified [the total cost of the severance pack-
age], '" 1 7 that fact did "not create a reasonable inference that the Board
failed to consider the potential cost to Disney in the event that they
decided to terminate Ovitz without cause."118 Then, the lower court
went one step further, finding that even if the plaintiffs claimed that
the board had failed to calculate the cost to Disney, that allegation was
insufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. 119 Instead, according to
the lower court, regardless of what the board's expert said in hind-
sight, the board presumably had not considered the cost of the pack-
age to be material at the time the agreement was entered into. 120
The Court of Chancery stressed the specific protection of the bus-
inessjudgment rule from hindsight evaluations of plaintiffs' claims.12 1
Instead, it found that even if the board failed to consider the "exact
amount of a severance payout but nonetheless [was] fully informed
about the manner in which such a payout would be calculated," it had
met its duty of care. 122 Thus, concluding that the plaintiffs had failed
to plead sufficient facts to support a reasonable doubt that the board
was not reasonably informed on the issue, the court dismissed the
First Complaint.
1 23
On appeal, the supreme court reviewed the First Complaint in
the context of the plaintiffs' failure to make demand on the Disney
board before filing suit.12 4 The relevant test in such situations is the
115 Id. at 251. The Economist referred to the Termination Agreement as "an obscene
pay-off to ... a failed former company president." Barbarians, supra note 10, at 62.
116 746 A.2d at 251.
117 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361 (Del. Ch. 1998) (al-
terations in original), affd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded by Brehm 1, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000).
118 Id. at 361-62.





124 Brehm I, 746 F.2d 244, 254 & n.19 (Del. 2000).
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"demand futility" standard. 2 5 This test has two alternative prongs:
whether the plaintiffs have created a reasonable doubt that the direc-
tors are disinterested and independent, or "whether the [complaint]
creates a reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was other-
wise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment."'
' 26
Applying the de novo standard in the demand-futility context, the
supreme court first considered whether a majority of the board mem-
bers in office at the time the plaintiffs filed the First Complaint were
disinterested and independent. 127 Holding that the plaintiffs failed to
plead sufficient facts to support their allegations of interest and lack
of independence, the supreme court rejected the plaintiffs' conten-
tions and upheld the lower court's findings on this issue.' 28 As a re-
sult, the court precluded the plaintiffs from repleading their
allegations on this point.129
The supreme court next turned to what it termed the "Analytical
Framework for the Informational Component of Directorial Decision-
making."'130 Here, the court responded to the plaintiffs' contention
that the lower court had applied an incorrect standard.' 3 ' The plain-
tiffs argued that the lower court had erred in requiring only that the
board be "reasonably informed" when it makes decisions, but not "in-
formed of every fact."'132 According to the plaintiffs, this standard was
"too lax." 13 3 Instead, they proposed that the standard should be
whether the board members availed themselves of "all material infor-
mation reasonably available .. .,134 In response, the supreme court
agreed with the lower court's finding that directors need not be in-
formed of "every fact[,] '' 135 but explained that the board "is responsi-
ble for considering only material facts that are reasonably available.
"136
Next, the court turned to the actual pleadings to determine
whether they met the Rule 23.1 standard.' 37 Here, the courts dif-
125 Id. at 256.
126 Id. at 256-57 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)).
127 Id.
128 Id. at 257-58.
129 See id. at 258.
130 Id.
131 See id.
132 Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 259.
136 Id. In fleshing out this test, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that although the
Court of Chancery's description of the standard was arguably consistent with prior Dela-
ware Supreme Court formulations, the lower court did not state the test in a helpful man-
ner. Id.
137 Id. at 259-62.
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fered. 138 After finding that the potential payouts under the Employ-
ment Agreement were material in light of their size, the supreme
court concluded that the plaintiffs' pleadings indicated that the num-
bers were reasonably available, thus satisfying the tests of materiality
and reasonable availability. 13
9
In examining whether the plaintiffs had met their burden, how-
ever, the supreme court held that one further step was necessary-
determining whether the lower court's interpretation of the First
Complaint's allegations was accurate. 140 On this issue, the supreme
court found that the lower court had erred. 141 According to the
court, the Court of Chancery had made two findings regarding the
First Complaint. 142 First, it found that the plaintiffs had alleged that
only the expert, and not the board, had failed to calculate the pay-
out.143 Second, it found that even if the board failed to do so, the
expert's belief that the calculation was not critical indicated that any
failure by the board to make the calculation did not raise a reasonable
doubt as to its due care.
144
The supreme court read the First Complaint differently. It held
that a fair reading of the complaint indicated that the plaintiffs al-
leged the expert had "admitted that 'nobody'-not [it] and not the
directors-made [the] calculation."'1 45 As a result, the supreme court
concluded that the lower court's reading of the First Complaint was
"too restrictive."'146 Further, the supreme court criticized this reading
as too simplistic at the pleading stage to constitute a "comprehensive
analysis of the issue."1
47
The supreme court held, however, that the Court of Chancery's
error was harmless, because the pleadings indicated that the board
had been advised by a compensation expert and thus, the board was
entitled to a presumption of reliance on that expert. 148 Here, the su-
preme court applied the expert provision of Delaware General Corpo-
ration Law, even though the lower court had not done so explicitly. 149
Under section 141(e) of this statute, a board is entitled to rely on an
expert and, if sued, is entitled to the business judgment rule standard
138 Id. at 260-62.
139 Id. at 259-60.
140 Id. at 260-61.
141 Id.










of review on the question of whether that reliance was proper and in
good faith.
1 50
The supreme court then held that the First Complaint was subject
to dismissal because the plaintiffs had failed to plead sufficient partic-
ularized facts to support this claim. 151 The court then provided a list
of the types of facts that, if proved, could provide evidence of a fiduci-
ary breach and, therefore, enable a complaint to withstand dismis-
sal. 152 To meet that burden, the court held that the plaintiffs needed
to provide evidence of one of the following types of allegations.
153
First, the directors did not actually rely on the expert. 154 Second,
their "reliance was not in good faith. '155 Third, the board did not
reasonably believe that the advice was within the expert's area of com-
petence.1 56 Fourth, the expert was not selected with reasonable care
and the directors were responsible for such failure. 157 Fifth, the con-
tested subject matter was "so obvious" that failing to consider it
amounted to gross negligence by the board, regardless of the expert's
advice or lack thereof.1 58 Or, sixth, the board's decision was so "un-
conscionable as to constitute waste or fraud." 159 According to the su-
preme court, the First Complaint failed to include particularized
allegations of any of these six categories. 160 As a result, it affirmed
dismissal of the First Complaint, but gave the plaintiffs leave to
replead.1 61
The supreme court also addressed the plaintiffs' argument that
the board violated the substantive due care standard by committing
waste in approving Ovitz's Employment Agreement. 162 Here, the
court inquired into whether the lower court erred when it rejected
the contention that the Employment Agreement was waste ab initio
because it allegedly created an incentive for Ovitz to seek non-fault
termination as early as possible.' 63 The lower court had dismissed the
waste allegation, finding that it did not meet the test for waste, which
requires a transaction to be "'so one sided that no business person of
ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation ha[d]
150 DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2001) (amended 2003); see746 F.2d at 261 & n.51.












163 Id. at 262-63.
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received adequate consideration"' for it, 164 According to the Court of
Chancery, the Disney board had determined that it needed to offer a
significant package to Ovitz in order to hire him, and the First Com-
plaint could be fairly read to support the conclusion that the option
vesting schedule created a disincentive for Ovitz to leave Disney
early.
165
The supreme court agreed with the lower court's findings that
the First Complaint was "deficient," but again left open the possibility
of a successful amended complaint. 166 Moreover, the court asserted
that the due care matter was only procedural.' 67 In so doing, it re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument that the board's decision was faulty in
and of itself.168 Rather, the court held that an irrational decision, like
waste, would be one that was at the "outer limit of the business judg-
ment rule," and that if the board lacked good faith in making such a
decision, it might lose the favorable presumption of that rule.
169
Here, again, the court referred to good faith rather than due care,
further carving out space for good faith as a separate duty.
The plaintiffs further argued that the later board decision for the
payout in the Termination Agreement also amounted to waste. 170 In
support of this claim, the plaintiffs argued that when Ovitz left Disney,
he did so in a manner not provided for in the non-fault termination
provisions of the Employment Agreement-either by resigning or by
committing acts sufficient for the board to terminate him for cause.
17'
Thus, they argued that by paying him, the directors wasted Disney as-
sets. 1 72 Here, the supreme court noted that the First Complaint did
not set forth sufficient particularized facts to show that Ovitz either
resigned or unarguably breached the Employment Agreement.1 73
Moreover, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs' argument was, in
part, premised on the assumption that Ovitz would not resign until he
could collect the payout, and thus the argument that he had resigned
was contradictory. 174 The court also found that the for-cause argu-
ment lacked sufficiently pleaded facts to meet the applicable stan-
164 In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(quoting Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 1993)), affd in part, rev'd in
part, and remanded by Brehm I, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
165 Id. at 362-63.
166 Brehm I, 746 A.2d at 263.











dard. 7 5 Nevertheless, the court held that the plaintiffs could replead
this issue as well.
176
Finally, although discovery is not allowed at the motion to dismiss
stage in such cases in Delaware, the supreme court made clear that
the plaintiffs were entitled to seek relevant Disney books and records
pursuant to section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law.
177
That provision allows shareholders access to corporate books and
records when they are able to show a proper purpose for their re-
quest.178 The supreme court did not analyze whether the plaintiffs
could meet the standard of showing a proper purpose, but it did indi-
cate that the lower court should treat the matter expeditiously 179 and
in so doing, indicated that the plaintiffs should be allowed access to
books and records, though not without limits.
E. In re The Walt Disney Derivative Litigation
180
The plaintiffs obtained information pursuant to section 220 and
filed a repleaded complaint (the "Second Complaint"). Chancellor
Chandler's opinion analyzing the Second Complaint reveals that the
plaintiffs had obtained information that, at least at the motion to dis-
miss stage, raised some very troubling facts. Indeed, the Chancellor
found that the plaintiffs had pleaded allegations which, if true, indi-
cated a breach of good faith, allowing the action to survive the motion
to dismiss.181 As the following discussion reveals, the Chancery
Court's examination of the facts of the Second Complaint reveals sub-
stantial differences from those initially pleaded.
8 2
To begin with, Chancellor Chandler's opinion indicates that the
plaintiffs pleaded that the value of the Termination Agreement to
Ovitz exceeded $140,000,000 for what amounted to one year of em-
ployment. 183 Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the board had not
reviewed either the Employment Agreement or the Termination
Agreement. 184 Thus, according to Brehm II, the Second Complaint al-
leged that board minutes revealed that the board in office at the time
of the Employment Agreement (the "Old Board") failed to "ask any
questions about the details of Ovitz's salary, stock options, or possible
175 Id. at 265-66.
176 Id. at 266.
177 Id.
178 See DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (2002).
179 Brehm I, 746 A.2d at 267.
180 Brehm II, 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003).
181 Id. at 278.
182 Id. at 279.
183 Id. at 278-79.
184 See id. at 281.
[Vol. 89:456
DELAWARE'S GOOD FAITH
termination.' 1 8 5 Moreover, the allegations stated that the Old Board
did not consider the "consequences of a termination, or the various
payout scenarios that existed."' 8 6 Instead, according to Chancellor
Chandler, the plaintiffs alleged that all of the negotiations were left to
Eisner, Ovitz's long-time friend.1 87 Neither Eisner nor Ovitz signed
the Employment Agreement until after Ovitz began working for Dis-
ney. 8 8 Further, although the Old Board's compensation committee
had been informed about the nature of an early draft, the plaintiffs
alleged that it did not see either this version or the final Employment
Agreement.18 9 Apparently, the committee also did not request to see
any version of the Employment Agreement. 9 0
Yet, according to Brehm II, the Second Complaint alleged that, as
signed, the Employment Agreement provided Ovitz with more gener-
ous terms than the early draft. 19 1 For example, the final agreement
included a provision allowing Ovitz access to the termination benefits
with a non-fault provision rather than the initial wrongful termination
provisions.' 9 2 Additionally, the non-fault termination provisions were
more generous than the wrongful termination provisions and were,
according to Chancellor Chandler's opinion, so potentially lucrative
that they created an incentive for Ovitz to leave the company as soon
as possible after signing the Employment Agreement.1
9 3
According to the plaintiffs, that is indeed what Ovitz did. As re-
layed by the Court of Chancery, the Second Complaint alleged that
Ovitz was not well-suited to the position. Rather than taking the time
to learn the job, he cancelled meetings with the company's chief fi-
nancial officer, Stephen Bollenbach, who said that Ovitz "didn't un-
derstand the duties of an executive at a public company[,] and he
didn't want to learn."'19 4 Instead, according to the court, Ovitz simply
began to look for other work, with Eisner's permission. 19 5 Unfortu-
nately, Ovitz did not obtain the job he sought, and as a result, the







189 Id. at 281-82.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 282-83.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 283.
194 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pls.' Sec-





Under those provisions, Ovitz could not leave Disney and garner
the termination benefits unless: "(1) he was not elected or retained as
president and a director of Disney; (2) he was assigned duties materi-
ally inconsistent with his role as president;" or (3) he was not paid his
salary or options. 197 Absent the occurrence of one of these events, he
could not resign without potential liability to Disney for damages, and
he could not access the benefits of a non-fault termination under the
Employment Agreement. 198 The plaintiffs alleged, however, that Eis-
ner labored with Ovitz to achieve a severance that would allow access
to those benefits.1 99
Further, according to the Second Complaint, although the board
knew that Eisner was working to complete a non-fault termination, it
was never told the terms and did not inquire. 200 Instead, according to
the Court of Chancery's recitation of the allegations, when Ovitz's de-
parture became public, neither the board then in office (the "New
Board") nor the compensation committee had been consulted about
or had given their approval of the Termination Agreement.20 1 Fur-
ther, the allegations stated that there was no record of the New Board
taking any action to approve the Termination Ag:eement after it be-
came public. 20 2 Later, according to the Second Complaint, the Ter-
mination Agreement was further revised with terms arguably more
favorable to Ovitz, and the New Board still did not review or approve
it.203 Yet according to Chancellor Chandler's review of the allega-
tions, Disney's bylaws required board approval for the non-fault termi-
nation. 20 4 Despite that requirement, and the New Board's knowledge
of ongoing negotiations, the New Board took no action to question,
affirm, or rescind the Termination Agreement. 20 5 Moreover, Chan-
cellor Chandler found that based on the Second Complaint's allega-
tions, no record of any discussion of alternatives or options existed. 20 6
In response, the defendants argued that the breach of fiduciary
duty, if any, at issue in this case amounted only to a breach of the duty
of due care, exculpable under Disney's charter.207 The Court of
Chancery, however, rejected the due care argument, finding that a
fair reading of the Second Complaint created doubt as to whether the
197 Id. at 283-84.






204 Id. at 285.
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. at 286.
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Board had acted "honestly and in good faith." 20 8 Unlike their due
care counterparts, dishonest and bad faith actions are not
exculpable.
20 9
The defendants further argued that Ovitz's prior position at the
Creative Artists Agency warranted a large compensation package at
Disney, thus justifying the Employment Agreement.210 Moreover,
they argued that the Termination Agreement was appropriate because
the board wanted to avoid protracted litigation with him. 211 In es-
sence, they argued that the two agreements represented reasonable
exercises of business judgment. Chancellor Chandler rejected those
arguments, finding that the facts as pleaded in the Second Complaint
indicated that neither the Old nor the New Board (the "Boards") had
exercised any business judgment or made any good faith attempts to
fulfill their fiduciary duties to the shareholders with respect to either
agreement.2
12
Instead, the Chancellor found that the Second Complaint alleged
that the Boards allowed Eisner to make a unilateral decision to hire
Ovitz, design the terms of the Employment Agreement, and negotiate
the Termination Agreement.213 Although the compensation commit-
tee and the Old Board did review the hiring decision, no minutes of
any board meeting reflected any questions about or evidence of fur-
ther review or approval of the Employment Agreement.214 The same
was true of the non-fault termination and the Termination Agree-
ment.21 5 According to the Court of Chancery, the Second Complaint
alleged that neither the compensation committee nor the Boards eval-
uated the details of the salary, the Employment Agreement, or the
Termination Agreement. 21 6 Further, no evidence existed to show that
the Boards consulted experts at either the commencement or comple-
tion of Ovitz's employ with Disney.
217
The result, according to the Chancellor, was allegations directors
who had "consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities,
adopting a 'we don't care about the risks' attitude concerning a mate-
rial corporate decision. ' 218 In Chancellor Chandler's opinion, allega-
tions of such knowing or deliberate indifference amounted to





212 Id. at 287.
213 Id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 288.
216 Id. at 288-89.
217 Id.
218 Id. at 289.
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advance the best interests of the company. '" 21 9 In sum, the Court of
Chancery concluded, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, if the Second Complaint's alleged facts were true, they im-
plied that the director-defendants knew they were making material de-
cisions without adequate information or deliberation, and appeared
not to care if the decisions caused injury or loss to the corporation or
the shareholders. 220 Thus, the court concluded, such allegations were
sufficient to withstand dismissal and to be subjected to full
discovery.22
1
Brehm II thus built on the Delaware Supreme Court's opinion in
Brehm I. The ultimate outcome of this litigation is unknown, but it is
unlikely that the supreme court could have reached a different con-
clusion on the facts as relayed by Chancellor Chandler.
Importantly, the opinions reveal a clearly emerging third, and
separate, duty: that of good faith. Loyalty was not at issue. In Brehm I,
the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to plead any
facts on interest and lack of independence sufficient to allow replead-
ing on that point.2 2 2 Their failure to do so means that they failed to
meet the prongs of the business judgment rule traditionally used to
screen for loyalty concerns. Moreover, as recited in Brehm II, at least
with respect to the board allegations, the facts do not relate to the
types of conflict of interest or traditional loyalty issues into which
some have tried to cabin good faith. Further, in Brehm II, Chancellor
Chandler rejected the defendants' attempt to locate the facts in the
due care category.223 Instead, the facts that Chancellor Chandler re-
lays in Brehm H describe a board dominated by one officer and reflect
the egregious type of behavior-abdication of duties-that either de-
fines bad faith or calls into play the duty of good faith. As revealed by
former Chancellor Allen's opinion in Caremark, conscious disregard of
one's duties to the company presents a good faith issue, not simply a




As Part II illustrates, recent cases discussing and expanding the
duty of good faith separate it from the duties of care and loyalty.
These cases lay a foundation for further explication of the duty. Brehm
II, for example, adds considerable detail to the structure of good
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 289-90.
222 Brehm I, 746 A.2d 244, 258 (Del. 2000).
223 Brehm II, 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch. 2003).
224 See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
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faith. This section explores that structure further, provides a set of
definitions for the duty of good faith under Delaware law, and draws
some conclusions about how it might apply in future cases.
Delaware courts traditionally refer to three aspects of fiduciary
duties: loyalty, care, and good faith. 225 The discussion of Smith v. Van
Gorkom above covers the duty of care in some detail. 226 The duty of
loyalty requires that officers and directors act in the best interests of
the corporation and prioritize its interests over their own.2 27 The
cases examining it usually focus on conflicts of interest.228 Thus,
when fiduciaries have a conflict of interest in a transaction, they must
act in the corporation's interest and refrain from self-dealing, from
taking a benefit not generally available to other shareholders, and
from personally usurping opportunities that would benefit the corpo-
ration.2 29 In sum, fiduciaries should not obtain improper personal
advantages from their association with the corporation. Instead, they
should be disinterested in their decisions. Conflicts should be dis-
closed, and, if properly cleansed, such disclosure can remove any taint
from an otherwise interested decision. To screen claims at the motion
to dismiss stage, courts look for allegations of either interest or lack of
independence. This procedural test for loyalty usually measures a fi-
duciary's status of independence or disinterest before the substance of
the transaction is measured for either actual loyalty or an outcome
that is connected to a conflict and is sufficiently egregious. Sufficient
allegations of interest or lack of independence can result in a lack of
protection for fiduciaries through the business judgment rule.
These duties can overlap with each other. For example, good
faith can overlap with the duty of loyalty when a fiduciary's lack of
independence and interest come into play. A traditional formulation
of the duty of loyalty states that if directors and officers are indepen-
dent of and disinterested in the complained of transaction, the court
will not find them liable for a breach of that duty, unless the facts of
the transaction are "such that no person could possibly authorize [it]
225 See supra note 35.
226 See supra Part II.A.
227 See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys. Inc., 673 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Del. 1996) (explain-
ing and applying corporate opportunity doctrine).
228 See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2003) (arguing that Delaware loyalty cases exploring non-
conflict situations hold promise for resolving some egregious cases).
229 Delaware insulates directors and officers from liability for breaches of the duty of
loyalty if they fully disclose their conflicts and secure the appropriate form of disinterested
approval. Here, the mechanisms for doing so are mostly statutorily prescribed and, in
general, require disclosure and approval by sufficiently disinterested directors or share-
holders. Absent the requisite level of disinterestedness, the court will scrutinize the trans-
action for fairness to the corporation. Compliance with that standard ensures directors
and officers of protection through the business judgment rule.
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if he or she were attempting in good faith to meet their duty."2 3
Thus, one can simultaneously be disloyal and act in bad faith.
Importantly, one can also act in bad faith without being disloyal,
at least as traditionally viewed.23 1 That is, rather than relying on alle-
gations of the fiduciaries' status or conflict, bad faith focuses on the
indifference or egregiousness with which fiduciaries approached the
substance of the transaction. As a result, mere mismanagement is in-
sufficient to establish a breach of good faith. Erroneous or simply bad
decisions are also inadequate. If a corporate officer makes an expen-
diture for a corporate purpose, whether it "was wise or foolish, low risk
or high risk," it is outside the bounds of the court's review. 23 2 How-
ever, if the fiduciaries are independent and disinterested in an expen-
diture that a person in good faith could not possibly have approved,
they will violate the duty of good faith, without necessarily violating
their duty of loyalty.
23 3
Neither loyalty nor care was at issue in the Disney and Scattered
cases. Loyalty issues need not overlap with good faith. Instead, as it
emerged from those cases, good faith was not simply an overlay on, or
obligation related to the performance of, the other two duties, but its
own freestanding duty. The separate nature of good faith was appar-
ent in how the Disney and Scattered courts focused on the questioned
transactions and allegations of egregious decisions, rather than tradi-
tional loyalty or care breaches. These cases, then, demonstrate that
fiduciaries can act in bad faith for reasons other than "personal pecu-
niary interest." They also make clear that regardless of their motives,
fiduciaries "who consciously disregard [ ] [their] duties to the corpora-
tion and its stockholders may suffer a personal judgment for monetary
damages for any harm" caused. 23 4 Accordingly, deliberate indiffer-
ence to their tasks or intentional subversion of their duties will rele-
gate fiduciaries to the realm of bad faith.
Recall that in Scattered the Supreme Court held that an ostensibly
independent board that failed to act independently or carry out a rea-
sonable investigation would fail to perform its duties in good faith.
23 5
This formulation of good faith makes clear that independent status
alone is insufficient to withstand a breach-of-good-faith allegation.
The circumstances of the transaction or outcome must reflect good
230 Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1053 (Del. Ch. 1996).
231 But see Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000) ("By definition, a
director cannot simultaneously act in bad faith and loyally towards the corporation and its
stockholders.").
232 Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1053.
233 See Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985) (disclosure and approval
from appropriate group can cleanse otherwise tainted transaction).
234 Nagy, 770 A.2d at 48 n.2.
235 For a detailed discussion of the Scattered case, see supra Part II.C.
484 [Vol. 89:456
DELAWARE'S GOOD FAITH
faith as well. Thus, the Scattered court rejected a breach-of-good-faith
theory, noting that the plaintiffs had failed to plead that the board's
approach to, and process for, an investigation, as well its findings,
were sufficiently unreasonable. Instead, the court upheld a process
requiring that the Executive Committee appoint an untainted Special
Committee to complete an investigation into the allegations.
The court also noted that the undisputed facts revealed that the
Special Committee interviewed all of the people that the plaintiffs al-
leged had knowledge about the company problems. Based on its in-
vestigation, the Special Committee found that the allegations were
unsubstantiated. Further, the Executive Committee separately re-
viewed those findings, determining them to lack merit. As a result,
the supreme court held that absent other pleadings from the plaintiffs
indicating a failure by the Special Committee to look into an allega-
tion or the neglect of the Executive Committee to consider those find-
ings fully, the plaintiffs did not meet the standard of pleading a good-
faith issue. The opinion thus reveals that based on the facts before it,
the supreme court could not hold that the defendants had acted with
deliberate indifference to their role, or intentionally subverted or
avoided an assigned or otherwise materially important task. Instead,
based on the facts before it, the supreme court could conclude only
that the defendants had carried out their jobs, and although one
might disagree with the ultimate decision, their good faith in complet-
ing their task prevented further review.
From these facts, then, we can glean a further understanding of
how the duty of good faith differs from the duties of care and loyalty.
Fiduciaries acting in good faith abide by the norms of corporate gov-
ernance and comply with legal standards while performing their jobs.
Egregious or conspicuous failures to do so are subject to liability
under the duty of good faith. 236 For example, directors must ensure
that complaints about the company or its officers are honestly and
thoroughly investigated with sufficient care and attention to detail.
They must listen to information reported to them and question it not
just for its accuracy, but also for the good faith of those reporting it.
Officers, of course, must set up appropriate systems within the com-
pany to ensure its proper governance and share what they find with
the directors. Fiduciaries who fail to act in such a manner violate
their duty of good faith. When fiduciaries make material decisions,
they need to assure themselves that they know all of the material and
reasonably available facts and options before embarking on a major
program, granting their approval, or discontinuing an investigation.
236 See Brehm I, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (noting that violations of aspirational or
idealistic norms are not necessarily actionable).
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They cross the line when they abdicate, subvert, or ignore these re-
sponsibilities, or act with deliberate indifference toward them.
The supreme court's opinion allowing repleading in Disney fur-
ther fleshes out the good faith structure, illustrating that a failure to
be reasonably informed of a material fact-the payout scenarios for
the Ovitz Employment Agreement-might result in liability. Such a
failure, if it occurred, was not one of loyalty, because loyalty was not at
issue. In Brehm I, the court upheld the lower court's finding that the
plaintiffs had failed to plead sufficient allegations of either interest or
lack of independence, and no allegation of conflicts is discussed. In-
stead, in the First Complaint, the plaintiffs argued that the board had
not considered the payout scenarios, and absent some form of depen-
dence or interest, that claim was not loyalty-based. 237 Nor, as the
court found in Brehm II, was it one of due care.
The situation as pleaded in Brehm II suggests an egregious failure
to perform. It is a good-faith based claim, akin to an utter failure to
monitor the material payout scenarios, abdication. As pleaded, it is
not a situation in which the board, in good faith, took negligent, or
even grossly negligent, action. Instead, in Brehm II, the Court of Chan-
cery addressed allegations from the Second Complaint arguing that
the New Board abdicated a responsibility that the by-laws required it
to shoulder with regard to the Termination Agreement. Put another
way, the court read the Second Complaint to allege that the New
Board acted with deliberate indifference to its assigned task. The
court's view of those allegations, in conjunction with the facts of Brehm
I, reveals that even where interest and independence or traditional
conflicts of interest are not at issue, and no allegations of due care
violations exist, sufficiently faulty actions that no well-intentioned,
properly governing fiduciaries could take, are actionable as good faith
violations.
The Brehm opinions also demonstrate that good faith can be at
issue in executive compensation and other settings.23 8 In Brehm, the
fiduciaries allegedly allowed the completion of a Termination Agree-
ment valued at $140 million, thereby specifically raising a compensa-
tion issue. But the language of the opinions extends beyond
compensation and waste, making clear, as did the Scattered court, that
237 If it is a loyalty claim at all, it is so only in the sense that one who fails to do his duty
or reasonably attempt to fulfill it is acting disloyally, even if not, for example, in the con-
flicted manner on which Delaware case law has generally focused. This type of loyalty
claim is rarely explored in Delaware, perhaps because of the conflict oriented business
judgment rule approach. For a discussion of Delaware's approach to loyalty issues that
considers those cases in two lights, betrayal and devotion, see Johnson, supra note 228.
238 See also Aronoff v. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (finding
that excessive difference between value of assets expended and benefits received is evi-
dence of bad faith in waste setting).
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good faith applies in other contexts as well. If the conduct at issue is
sufficiently irresponsible, even if about neither compensation nor self-
dealing, good faith is implicated. As a result, for example, fiduciaries
who fail to attend or attend to board meetings, or who do not ensure
consideration of the requisite amount of information for decisions on
material questions in those meetings, act irresponsibly. Such behav-
ior, if sufficiently egregious, is now appropriately branded a breach of
good faith.
The duty of good faith presumably also applies where candor and
disclosure are implicated. Disclosure is sometimes referred to as a
separate duty, though it is not listed as part of the Delaware triad of
care, loyalty, and good faith. 239 The so-called duty of candor arises
out of agency law, and its boundaries remain undefined when applied
to corporate fiduciaries. 240 In the post-Enron era, however, this duty
and the apparent failure of officer fiduciaries to provide information
to board fiduciaries, and of board fiduciaries to question or tell share-
holders about the actions of their officers and others, has drawn atten-
tion. Although the obligations to disclose and be candid are
undisputed, the duty is properly located as a subset of the duties of
care, loyalty, and good faith.
241
Consider the issues surrounding candor and disclosure. The de-
bate about when and where disclosure obligations are implicated fo-
cuses mostly on its boundaries. 242 The Court of Chancery, for
example, has noted that directors who knowingly or deliberately with-
hold information from shareholders material to a decision are exhib-
iting bad faith. 243 Arguably, the same standard should apply to
directors who withhold material information from one another and to
239 See supra note 35 (citing cases referring to triad of duties).
240 See Donald C. Langevoort, Agency Law Inside the Corporation: Problems of Candor and
Knowledge, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1187 (2003) (exploring agency law and its applications to
corporate fiduciaries and candor issues in light of financial scandals).
241 Crescent/Mach I Partners, L.P. v. Turner, 2000 WL 1481002, at *16 (Del. Ch. Sept.
29, 2000).
242 See generally NAGY ET AL., SECURITIEs LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT, at 30 n.1 (West
2003) (questioning where boundary lies between deceptive conduct and conduct constitut-
ing mere breach of fiduciary duty); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: The
Corporate Director's Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1087 (1996) (considering
scope of fiduciary duty of disclosure); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountabil-
ity: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law 's Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REv. 505
(2000) (discussing role of corporate fiduciary law in regulating corporate reporting and
disclosure); Jennifer O'Hare, Director Communications and the Uneasy Relationship Between the
Fiduciary Duty of Disclosure and the Anti-Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws, 70 U. CIN.
L. REV. 475 (2002) (analyzing to what extent Congress should expand federal securities law
to cover actions alleging breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure).
243 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 1995 WL 600881, at *7 (Del. Ch. Sept. 22, 1995), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999), vacated by 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001); see Malone
v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998).
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officers who withhold information from boards. 244 Disclosure allega-
tions related to conflicts of interest or a fiduciary's personal interests
implicate loyalty. The duty of care issue arises when a director's omis-
sion or misstatement occurs in good faith, but results from the direc-
tor's "erroneous judgment. '' 245 In such a situation, the duty of loyalty
is not implicated, 246 but an obvious or egregious violation, resulting
from abdication, subversion, or deliberate indifference, however, calls
good faith into play.
To further define the boundary of good faith, we must separate it
from what a defendant might prefer to characterize as a care-based
situation. The distinction is key to the corporate governance regula-
tion that can occur through a separate duty. If only the duty of care
applies, the directors are exculpated and thereby effectively insulated
from personal liability. The Disney fiduciaries, for example, at-
tempted to persuade Chancellor Chandler that the plaintiffs pleaded
only a due care allegation. 247 The Chancellor rejected that argument,
and the effect of his decision was powerful. 248 If the duty of good
faith applies to acts or omissions even where the duty of loyalty is not
otherwise implicated, the claims are not exculpable, and the potential
for monetary liability expands. 249 Brehm II and Scattered both lay the
groundwork for such liability. More importantly, when good faith
emerges as a separate duty, it can apply to situations where fiduciaries
failed to adhere to basic practices or forms. It can, therefore, regulate
non-conflicted but deliberately indifferent behavior and transactions,
creating incentives for action rather than passivity.
Good faith based liability, then, moves the bar from negligent be-
havior to deliberately indifferent, egregious, subversive, or knowing
behavior, and thereby raises issues related to the motives of the ac-
tors. 250 Of course, the key question is how to define "egregious."
Without an appropriate line between the grossly negligent duty of
care violations and those that are more deliberate and egregious,
good faith will not serve as a meaningful separate duty, and it will raise
244 See Potter v. Pohlad, 560 N.W.2d 389, 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). Such an allega-
tion would involve a breach of the duty of candor, which is a hybrid duty involving an
underlying fiduciary duty breached in the context of a disclosure. See, e.g., McMullin v.
Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 925 (Del. 2000) (noting that fiduciaries "must exercise due care,
good faith, and loyalty whenever they communicate with shareholders").
245 See Crescent, 2000 WL 1481002, at *16.
246 Id.
247 See Brehm II, 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
248 See id.
249 See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1094 (Del. 2001).
250 See, e.g., Aronoffv. Albanese, 446 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (noting
that motives and personal benefits to directors are relevant to the analysis of whether their
actions are recklessly indifferent).
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the same concerns as those that followed Smith v. Van Gorkom. 2 5 1
Some types of gross negligence, for example, that amount to a failure
to adhere to a process before making a decision fall into the due care
category. Presumably, then, good faith claims must be different from
negligence and gross negligence.
Two of the cases in this Article that discuss good faith indicate
that a breach of the duty requires motive-based allegations of severely
reckless or seemingly intentional behavior. 2 52 Situations involving de-
liberate indifference or abdication would also cross the line. Recall
that in Caremark, Chancellor Allen drew such a line, explaining that
sustained failures to monitor for compliance with criminal laws were
unacceptable. 253 The court invoked this standard in the context of
the sentencing guidelines, which provide lenience for compliance and
monitoring programs.254 If the fiduciaries had failed to provide
mechanisms that connected noncompliance with significant and real
consequences, their failure would have been inexcusable. Thus, as
Chancellor Allen suggested in Caremark, facts of that sort, even if they
do not involve loyalty issues, should raise the courts' ire.2 55 But, the
standard applies equally well to other situations in which the board or
officers fail to set up any systems by which they can measure the com-
pany's performance, review material matters, or address concerns
about company compliance with the law or corporate governance
norms. Complete abdication, whether intentional or deliberately in-
different, should result in good faith liability.
Interestingly, situations involving deliberate indifference are of
the type evaluated regularly under the scienter standard in federal se-
curities law. Scienter is a key element of claims pursuant to section
10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act 25 6 and the accompanying
Rule lOb-5257 ("10b-5 claims"). In reviewing this element, courts focus
on the defendants' state of mind in relation to the misstatement or
omission. 258 Plaintiffs who wish to succeed with their lOb-5 claims
must plead scienter, or facts supporting their claim that the defendant
made a misstatement or omission with sufficient recklessness. 259
251 See supra note 58.
252 Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70 (Del. 1997); In re Caremark
Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 696 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
253 See Caremark, 695 A.2d at 969.
254 See id.
255 See id. at 969-70.
256 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000)).
257 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000).




10b-5 claims are subject to heightened pleading standards, like
claims subject to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1,260 and there is
a significant amount of case law analyzing different factual scenarios
and explicating the law as applied to those situations. 26' The scienter
standard has its early roots in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,262 a United
States Supreme Court case which addressed whether proof of a viola-
tion of a 10b-5 claim should require scienter or something less. The
Court held that the language and history of the statute required some-
thing more than negligent nonfeasance and, in fact, allowed liability
only for people who did not act in good faith. 263 Thus, the Court
drew the line between good faith and bad faith as one of the ways in
which it delimited recklessness.
26 4
Ernst & Ernst's progeny provide guidance on what is simply gross
negligence and what amounts to severely reckless or egregious behav-
ior in the context of scienter.2 65 The cases draw a line based on a
connection between the defendants' knowledge and their misstate-
ments or omissions. Scienter need not necessarily be pleaded with
facts suggesting actual knowledge. For particularly egregious behav-
ior, it is presumed that knowledge of an omission or misstatement
existed, or should have existed.
266
The standard defeats complaints that fail to allege either inten-
tional misconduct or conduct that is sufficiently willful that bad faith
is at issue. The cases provide examples of measures for the type of
egregious, subversive, or deliberately indifferent conduct this Article
proposes as the standard for good faith. Under such a standard,
known or obvious infractions of corporate rules or governance stan-
dards, or failures to create such standards, would be actionable. Fidu-
ciaries who fail to perform assigned tasks and to set up mechanisms to
ensure that they are aware of such tasks would also be actionable.
And, of course, good faith reliance on the reports or information of
others would still defeat such claims.
260 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1.
261 See, e.g., id.
262 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
263 Id. at 206.
264 Id. at 205-06.
265 See Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of
the PSLRA's Internal-Information Standard on '33 and '34 Act Claims, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 537,
545-52 (1998) (collecting and analyzing cases interpreting scienter requirement).
266 See, e.g., Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla.
1976). The Franke court defined reckless conduct as:
[A] highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely simple, or even in-
excusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of or-
dinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers
that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must




Of course, like their Delaware counterparts, these federal securi-
ties cases do not provide a single bright line rule that distinguishes
scienter from other states of mind.2 6 7 They cannot. Each corporate
situation and fiduciary is different. As a result, the Delaware courts
deploy standards, not rules.268 The result is fact-based determinations
of law that evolve over time with each fact pattern and provide defini-
tions of excessive recklessness that are applicable in the fiduciary
context.
2 69
Consider, for example, the Second Circuit's opinion in Novak v.
Kasaks.270 In Novak, the court refused to adopt bright line rules de-
limiting sufficient and insufficient pleadings of scienter, indicating
that a synthesis of its case law revealed four scenarios in which the
court had found that a complaint contained an appropriate inference
of scienter.2 7 1 Under the court's first scenario, the requisite inference
of scienter exists where plaintiffs plead with particularity that the de-
fendants "benefited in a concrete and personal way from the pur-
ported fraud. '' 272 These situations are most likely to fall into the
loyalty-based category of good faith claims, like breaches of the corpo-
rate opportunity doctrine, and are probably the easiest to diagnose.
Fiduciaries who approve outright abuses may well have breached both
good faith and loyalty duties.
The Novak court next addressed pleadings alleging that the de-
fendants "engaged in deliberately illegal behavior." 273 Pleadings with
this type of factual scenario are not unfamiliar to the Delaware courts.
The plaintiffs in both Scattered and Caremark alleged illegal behavior or
deliberate ignorance of such behavior by the defendants. 274 And, in
both cases, the courts made clear the plaintiffs needed to flesh out
those scenarios to survive dismissal.2 75 Sufficient pleadings would in-
clude fact-based allegations that the defendants engaged in such be-
havior, did not set up systems for compliance, or ignored deficiencies
267 The Delaware courts have utilized standards from federal securities law in other
contexts, for example, in the definition of the term "material." See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty
Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (citing TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449
(1976) (adopting definition of materiality for federal securities purposes)).
268 See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 903, 961 n.240 (2002)
(discussing differences between rules and standards in general and in Delaware in particu-
lar); Sitkoff, supra note 104.
269 See Deborah A. DeMott, Puzzles and Parables: Defining Good Faith in the MBO Context,
25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 15, 19 (1990).




274 Scattered Corp. v. Chi. Stock Exch., Inc., 701 A.2d 70, 71 (Del. 1997); In re
Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 964 (Del. Ch. 1996).
275 See Scattered, 701 A.2d at 73; Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971-72.
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in the corporate system or other fiduciaries. 276 Given such facts, the
Delaware courts would be hard-pressed to dismiss a case.
The Second Circuit also held that a third type of scenario, com-
plaints sufficiently alleging that the defendants either "knew facts or
had access to information suggesting that their public statements were
not accurate," can meet the pleading standard. 2 77 Of course, lOb-5
claims are premised on a misstatement or omission, and good faith
claims need not be, but this test is quite useful for thinking about
good faith violations. 278 Officers who give only part of the necessary
information to their boards violate their fiduciary duty of candor in
the context of their duty of good faith. Directors who provide share-
holders with partial or incorrect information, knowing it to be errone-
ous or having the ability to ascertain the accuracy of the statement,
would also be in violation. As discussed above, candor or disclosure
violations occur through breaches of loyalty, care, or good faith.
Where the candor violation is willful or deliberately reckless, although
not disloyal, it falls in the good faith realm.
2 79
Brehm H also contained allegations that might fit into this cate-
gory.280 Indeed, the Novak standard is similar to the one applied in
Brehm L There, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the payout
amounts at issue were sufficiently material so that if the plaintiffs
could plead that the defendants had failed to consider those scenarios
before agreeing to the Employment and Termination Agreements,
they would fail to meet their duty of good faith. 281 This standard is
not one of simply neglecting to meet one's duties of disclosure and
candor, but of failing in an obvious, egregious, or even willful way to
act as a responsible member of the board or management team.
Moreover, the concern extends beyond good or bad process.
The focus in this third scenario, is on the circumstances surrounding
the act or omission in question. Under this standard, board members
are at risk when they fail to ask questions and monitor officers and
material corporate decisions. They would also be at risk when they
fail to investigate the circumstances surrounding decisions by officers
who make "obviously evasive and suspicious statements," 28 2 or when
they make decisions without assuring themselves that they are decid-
ing based on sufficient information.
Again, the facts pleaded in Brehm II presented such a scenario.
According to Chancellor Chandler's opinion, the plaintiffs alleged
276 See Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971-72.
277 Novak, 216 F.3d at 311.
278 See supra notes 256-64 and accompanying text.
279 See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
280 See Brehm II, 825 A.2d 275, 278 (Del. Ch. 2003).
281 Brehm 1, 746 A.2d 244, 259-60 (Del. 2000).
282 Novak, 216 F.3d at 309 (quoting SEC v. McNulty, 137 F.3d 732, 741 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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that Eisner failed to keep the board informed about the status of the
negotiations on the Employment Agreement, or even its final
terms.283 The same was true of the Termination Agreement. The al-
legations that he failed to do so were sufficient to plead a breach of
the duty of good faith.
2 84
In Brehm II, the plaintiffs also alleged that the board failed to ask
Eisner about the negotiations and Agreements. 2 8 5 The allegations
that it failed to do so were sufficient to plead a breach of its duty of
good faith.2 86 By not inquiring, the board arguably breached its duty
of good faith to execute its obligations responsibly. Had it asked and
been lied to, the board might have met its duty of care. Compliance
with its good faith duty might require the board to react further if the
proposed agreements were so far out of the bounds of business judg-
ment as to be egregious and warrant further investigation. A lying
officer, of course, would have acted in bad faith.
Finally, the Novak court described a fourth category of pleadings
that might reach the high threshold for scienter allegations. It held
that plaintiffs can succeed in pleading scienter by alleging defendants'
failure "to check on information they had a duty to monitor.' '28 7 This
standard is very similar to the Caremark standard, which requires the
board and officers to have compliance programs in place.2 8 8 A fiduci-
ary's failure to implement the programs and to ensure regular and
accurate reporting under such programs might, in egregious cases,
amount to a good faith violation. But, the standard could also apply
in a situation like that pleaded in Brehm II, where the board is charged
with approving a Termination Agreement. The failure to do so is pre-
sumably a good faith violation by itself. But the failure to monitor
shifts in the negotiations of something as material as this Termination
Agreement 28 9 could amount to a breach beyond the bounds of ordi-
nary care and judgment: a breach of good faith.
The four Novak categories thus provide useful ways to consider
good faith. Although a breach of good faith need not be intentional
or conscious, it does require some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egre-
gious failure. That standard is like the standard of review applied to
pleadings of scienter in securities fraud claims: motive is relevant, but
not required. Intentional misstatements or omissions are actionable
and intentional breaches of fiduciary duties should be as well. But, as
the Disney cases make clear, allegations of unintentional but fla-
283 See Brehm II, 825 A.2d at 278.
284 See id.
285 Id. at 289.
286 See id.
287 Novak, 216 F.3d at 311.
288 See In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Liig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996).
289 See Brehm I1, 825 A.2d at 289.
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grantly reckless actions or inactions are also problematic and, if
proved, are breaches of good faith responsibilities.
The above discussion also illustrates that cases implicating good
faith can, but need not, implicate loyalty or care. Although good faith
may exist as a component of care and loyalty, confining it to those
situations would diminish its power as a prophylactic tool or incentive
for good fiduciary conduct. Care is a matter of process, not substance.
Grafting good faith onto breaches of care would limit it to the proce-
dural context. Similarly, loyalty is limited to situations involving con-
flicts of interest and generally viewed through the procedural
telescope of interest and lack of independence. The status-based case
law that has evolved in the loyalty context would further limit possible
applications of good faith, potentially rendering it useless in other
contexts. Further, the role of good faith as a separate duty proved
important in Brehm I and II, where loyalty and care were not at issue.
The value of a separate good faith duty, then, is in its potential
for addressing those outrageous and egregious abdications of fiduci-
ary behavior that are not simply the results of bad process or conflicts.
And, of course, its real value is not simply in the compensation it can
provide to, for example, Disney shareholders, but in the ex ante role it
can play in changing the behavior and incentives of corporate fiducia-
ries and, thereby changing corporate governance. As the role of of-
ficer fiduciaries has expanded, so must the duties of both officers and
those charged with monitoring them: directors.
CONCLUSION
In today's corporate structure, directors are less involved in man-
agement and the role of officers has grown, making the good faith
duty an increasingly important tool for controlling egregious fiduciary
behavior. When, as allegedly occurred at Disney, an officer provides
some, but not all, of the available material information to the board
for its consideration, and the board fails to question the officer or the
information before either making decisions based upon it or failing to
do so, a good faith issue is presented. 290 The duty involves not only
process or conflicts of loyalty, but also the circumstances, or lack
thereof, surrounding the substantive outcome. Thus, good faith is a
separate duty from those of care and loyalty. Fiduciaries who ignore
deficiencies in the information they receive or the reporting system
on which they rely violate their duty of good faith to the sharehold-
ers. 291 By ignoring those deficiencies, fiduciaries contribute to an at-
290 See id. at 287.
291 See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., I THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
CORPORATE DIRECTORS 83 (5th ed. 1998) (quoting federal district court's instructions to
jury regarding bad faith).
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mosphere of permissiveness, recklessness, or deliberate indifference
that can result in bad governance and business decisions, or worse,
illegal activity.
Strong enforcement of the duty of good faith creates an incentive
to prompt fiduciaries to better behavior, even if we cannot change
their character. That enforcement by the Delaware courts will, in
turn, protect the shareholders, whom Delaware law prohibits from as-
suming a managerial role. Shareholders, of course, are harmed by all
kinds of fiduciary failures, but those arising from failures to comply
with the common law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the other federal secur-
ities laws, and the requirements of the New York Stock Exchange and
other self-regulatory organizations-regardless of whether the failure
to comply carries with it a private right of action-may fall into the
category of good faith.
Facts like those pleaded in Brehm I and /I test Delaware's good
faith. In those cases, the Delaware courts met the test. They ac-
cepted, at least pending full discovery, allegations that fiduciaries
completely abdicated their responsibility to the shareholders. 292 Such
strong enforcement of good faith standards by the stewards of state
corporate law contributes to good corporate governance norms. It
also increases the good faith of shareholders in Delaware as the appro-
priate home for business and as the place for creating and enforcing
those norms.
292 Brehm II, 825 A.2d at 278; Brehm I, 746 A.2d 244, 268 (Del. 2000).
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